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The news that Lehman Brothers faced imminent failure spread
globally on a Sunday, a day when financial markets around the world
were closed.1 Mere knowledge of Lehman's looming demise had
bankers worldwide bracing for what would happen when global mar-
kets opened on Monday morning.2 Indeed, Lehman's failure turned
out to be a trigger that would turn an American financial meltdown
into a crisis of global proportions.3 As the Dow plummeted, so too did
markets around the world: by Thursday, for example, stocks in Hong
Kong and Tokyo had dropped 4.7% and 2.2% respectively.4 Although
the focus of this Note is not the current financial crisis, the global
market reaction to news of a U.S. bank's failure illustrates in plain
terms what U.S. courts are reticent to acknowledge: in today's inter-
connected, globalized, and computerized world, information travels
rapidly and affects securities prices around the world, irrespective of
where the information is disseminated.
The ability of publicly available information to affect stock prices
coupled with the globalization of the world's economies has ushered
in an era of transnational securities fraud. The United States, with its
unique5 class-action mechanism, has become an increasingly attractive
forum not only for U.S. investors seeking to recoup their losses against
foreign defendants but also for foreign investors seeking to vindicate
their own rights in American courts. Consequently, our courts must
grapple with difficult questions regarding whether to hear claims by
foreign plaintiffs regarding transactions that are predominantly for-
eign-a question traditionally viewed by U.S. courts as one of subject-
matter jurisdiction. 6 This Note will examine how courts decide
whether to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims of for-
eign purchasers in an increasingly common form of securities class
I See Nelson D. Schwartz, In Europe, Panic Spread When Lehman Went Under: A Crisis in
Finance, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 11, 2008, at 12.
2 See id.
3 Id.
4 Joe Nocera, 36 Critical Hours; Playing Out in Places Most People Can't See, the Credit
Crisis Was Driven by Fear, Not Greed, and Shook the Financial World to Its Core, INT'L HERALD
TRiB., Oct. 3, 2008, at 1.
5 Although U.S.-style class actions are unique, several other countries have begun to
authorize forms of collective action. See infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206-08 (2d Cir. 1968). The ap-
propriateness of characterizing the question as one of subject-matter jurisdiction, however,
has been criticized. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5, Morrison v.
Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., No. 08-1191 (Oct. 27, 2009) ("[T]he court of appeals erred in treat-
ing the question before it as one of 'subject matter jurisdiction' . ... ."); Erez Reuveni,
Extraterritoriality as Standing: A Standing Theory of the Extraterritorial Application of the Securities
Laws, 43 U.C. DAviS L. REv. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 3-8, on file with author),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1496049 (arguing that the question is not one of sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction, but rather of statutory standing).
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action called the "F-cubed" (short for "foreign-cubed") action-that
is, a class action brought against a foreign issuer on behalf of a class
that includes foreign investors who transacted on a foreign exchange. 7
Federal securities class actions involving foreign elements are
hardly new to U.S. courts. Indeed, the Second Circuit faced the F-
cubed jurisdictional conundrum in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.8 in
1975. This decades-old question has received considerable attention
since the decision in Bersch but warrants renewed analysis for several
reasons. First, although cross-border transactions-and indeed, secur-
ities litigation involving cross-border transactions-may have been ex-
ceptional when the Second Circuit decided Bersch, such transactions
are now commonplace. To be sure, the number of federal securities
class actions targeting foreign issuers has skyrocketed since the mid-
1990s. Between 1996 and 2002 alone, the number of such cases more
than tripled.9 Furthermore, the most recent PricewaterhouseCoopers
Securities Litigation study indicates that in 2008, federal securities
class actions filed against foreign private issuers "hit an all-time
high." 10 Another study suggests that an international institutional in-
vestor has served as the lead plaintiff in ninety-eight cases since
1999.11 Second, collective-action mechanisms may soon become more
widely accepted outside of the United States. The European Union
and several individual countries have begun to "seriously consider col-
lective litigation alternatives."12 By way of example, the Italian Parlia-
ment recently passed a law introducing into the Consumer Code a
provision allowing certain consumer groups and associations to sue
collectively for tort liability, unfair trade practices, and anticompetitive
7 See In re Elan Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 08-cv-08761, 2009 WL 1321167, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
May 11, 2009) (defining "foreign-cubed" securities class actions as "actions in which a set of
1) foreign plaintiffs is suing 2) a foreign issuer in an American court for violations of
American securities laws based on securities transactions in 3) foreign countries" (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Stuart M. Grant & Diane Zilka, The Current Role of Foreign Inves-
tors in Federal Securities Class Actions, in SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE
2007, at 11, 17 (2007) (explaining that "a foreign investor who purchased securities of... a
foreign corporation . . . that traded on a foreign securities exchange" is colloquially re-
ferred to as a "foreign cubed" plaintiff).
8 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
9 See Michael D. Torpey et al., Defending Securities Claims, in 2008 ALI-ABA SECURITIES
LITIGATION PROGRAM 3 (2008).
10 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2008 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 43 (2009).
11 See Peter M. Saparoff & Katharine Coughlin Beattie, The Benefits of Including Foreign
Investors in U.S. Securities Class Action Suits, SEC. LITIG.J., Winter 2008, at 1, 11 ("In each year
since 1999, at least one international institutional investor has sought to serve as the lead
plaintiff in a securities class action, and, overall, did so 182 times in 98 different cases
during that period.").
12 PRICEWAT RHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2007 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 61 (2008). For
a useful overview of the various collective-redress regimes in European countries, see
Rachael Mulheron, The Case for an Opt-out Class Action for European Member States: A Legal and
Empirical Analysis, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 409, 415-27 (2009).
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behavior. 13 Going forward, therefore, U.S. courts ought to enunciate
clear rules regarding the application of domestic securities laws to for-
eign claims. Third-and perhaps most importantly-the federal se-
curities laws remain silent as to their extraterritorial application, 14
leaving a growing mess of lower-court precedent on how to apply a
pair of judicially created jurisdictional tests: the "effects test" and the
"conduct test."1 5 The recent decision of the Second Circuit-by most
standards, the authority on federal securities law16-in Morrison v. Na-
tional Australia Bank Ltd. (NAB I1)'1 did not provide clarity to the puz-
zle. In fact, the Second Circuit's decision in that case stands in
contrast to prior decisions in F-cubed cases. In November 2009, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to review NAB I,18 and the Court is
now preparing to hear oral argument.
13 See Vittorio Scognamiglio et al., Italy's New Class-Action Law, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING,
Mar. 27, 2008; see also Mulheron, supra note 12, at 419-20 (discussing the operation of the
new Italian collective-action law).
14 See, e.g., In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 355 (D.
Md. 2004) ("The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are silent
as to whether they apply extraterritorially, and Congress has provided little guidance on
the issue." (citing Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1987)));
Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: ManagingJuris-
dictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 14, 18-19 (2007) ("[T]he anti-fraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws do not speak directly to the scope of their application in
the international context."); Sherrie R. Savett, Plaintiffs' Vision of Securities Litigation: Current
Trends and Strategies, in SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2008, at 143, 203
(2008) ("The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are silent as
to whether they apply to transactions occurring in foreign jurisdictions, or with foreign
exchanges, companies, or investors."). Congress, however, may finally rectify this omission.
In December 2009, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives that included
provisions regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction under both the Securities Act and the Ex-
change Act. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 7216 (as introduced, Dec. 2, 2009) (expanding
jurisdiction to actions under the principal antifraud provisions of the securities laws involv-
ing "conduct within the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of
the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United States and in-
volves only foreign investors"). As certified by the House and sent to the Senate, however,
the bill gives U.S. courts this broad jurisdiction only in SEC enforcement actions. See H.R.
4173, 111th Cong. § 7216 (as passed by House, Dec. 11, 2009) (limiting the amendment to
any actions or proceedings brought or instituted by the [Securities and Exchange] Com-
mission or the United States"); H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 7216 (as referred in Senate to
committee, Jan. 20, 2010) (same).
15 Courts addressing jurisdictional questions in securities actions involving transna-
tional elements traditionally apply one of two different tests-the "effects test," which fo-
cuses on the location of the conduct's effects, and the "conduct test," which is based on the
location of the allegedly fraudulent conduct. See, e.g., Grant & Zilka, supra note 7, at
33-35. Lower federal courts, however, are split on how to apply these tests. See id. A more
detailed discussion of the effects and conduct tests appears infra Part II.
16 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (noting that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is "regarded as the
'Mother Court'" in the area of securities law).
17 547 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2008).
18 78 U.S.L.W. 3319 (U.S. Nov 30, 2009) (No. 08-1191).
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The solution to the F-cubed puzzle is far from straightforward,
and the Supreme Court has a difficult task before it. Should the
Court decide the case narrowly and leave the larger question to the
legislature, Congress ought to consider a complete overhaul of the
federal securities laws, including a clear pronouncement about their
extraterritorial reach. However, should the Court decide to tackle the
problem head-on, it might consider articulating new jurisdictional
tests (or modifying the old ones) in response to criticisms that the
effects test and conduct test, both nearly forty years old, are simply
outdated and no longer workable in today's world of interconnected
securities markets. 19 If the Court chooses to take on the problem it-
self, it will no doubt address the normative question about the extra-
territorial reach of the federal securities laws-that is, beyond the
logical arguments advanced in this Note about market efficiency, the
Court will doubtless consider how far the securities laws should reach.
The purpose of this Note is to explore how courts have tradition-
ally approached subject-matter jurisdiction in F-cubed cases and to as-
sess the wisdom of most courts' rejection of jurisdiction over the
claims of F-cubed plaintiffs. Part I provides an overview of the federal
securities laws, with a particular focus on their antifraud provisions.
Part II is a discussion of the effects test and the conduct test, the tradi-
tional judicial approaches to subject-matterjurisdiction under the fed-
eral securities laws. Part III introduces the "fraud-on-the-global-
market" theory, recently advanced by F-cubed plaintiffs in an effort to
satisfy the conduct test. Part III argues that the theory, which draws
on the traditional fraud-on-the-market doctrine, is too quickly dis-
missed by federal courts and that, given the realities of today's global
marketplace, the theory is sufficient to support the exercise of subject-
matter jurisdiction over the claims of F-cubed plaintiffs.
I
BACKGROUND ON THE FEDERAL SECURITIEs LAWS
In order to situate the debate on the extraterritorial reach of the
federal securities laws, this Part presents a basic overview of the Securi-
ties Act and the Exchange Act, focusing on their purpose and the gui-
dance they provide as to their application to foreign claims and
transactions. This Part then addresses the elements of a claim for se-
curities fraud under the Exchange Act, paying particular attention to
the market-efficiency hypothesis and the fraud-on-the-market
doctrine.
19 See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 14, at 41-42 (arguing not only that the consolidation
of financial markets, increase in cross-border transactions, and the facility of information
transmission have rendered the tests' focus on location archaic, but also that the tests have
failed to keep up with "the evolution of the substantive law governing securities fraud").
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A. Purpose of the Federal Securities Laws
Investors seeking to recover damages caused by securities fraud
typically bring claims in federal court under the Securities Act of 1933
(Securities Act) 20 or under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Ex-
change Act).21 Congress enacted these laws in the aftermath of the
Great Depression to protect the public from misrepresentations on
the securities markets. 22 More particularly, the federal securities laws
(1) "implement a philosophy of mandatory full disclosure that re-
quires market participants to reveal material information pertaining
to the securities they are offering, selling, or purchasing"; (2) "main-
tain market integrity by protecting investors from fraud"; and
(3) "promote ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing" through
the creation of civil liability.23
B. The Antifraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws
The Securities Act regulates the public offering of securities and
generally requires that an issuer file a registration statement and pro-
spectus with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prior to
offering or selling securities. Sections 11 and 12 are the principal an-
tifraud provisions in the Securities Act. Section 11 provides a cause of
action to purchasers in a registered offering if the registration state-
ment contains material misstatements or omissions. 24  Section
12(a) (2) provides for the liability of any issuer who offers or sells a
20 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (2006).
21 Id. § 78a.
22 See Brian P. Murray & Maurice Pesso, The Accident of Efficiency: Foreign Exchanges,
American Depository Receipts, and Space Arbitrage, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 383, 383 (2003).
23 Michael J. Calhoun, Tension on the High Seas of Transnational Securities Fraud: Broad-
ening the Scope of United States Jurisdiction, 30 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 679, 683 (1999) (footnotes
and internal quotation marks omitted).
24 Section 11(a) provides, in pertinent part:
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effec-
tive, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the state-
ments therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it
is proved that at the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or
omission) may ... sue- (1) every person who signed the registration state-
ment; (2) every person who was a director of (or person performing similar
functions) or partner in the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the
registration statement with respect to which his liability is asserted; (3)
every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration statement
as being or about to become a director .... or partner; (4) every account-
ant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession gives authority
to a statement made by him, who has with his consent been named as hav-
ing prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, . . . with
respect to the statement in such registration statement .... which purports
to have been prepared or certified by him; (5) every underwriter with re-
spect to such security.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1)-(5).
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security by means of a prospectus or oral communication containing
material misstatements or omissions. 25 Section 17 is the general an-
tifraud provision of the Securities Act and prohibits fraudulent inter-
state transactions. 26
The Exchange Act prohibits certain types of conduct in the mar-
kets and provides the SEC with disciplinary powers. The most impor-
tant antifraud provision in the Exchange Act is section 10(b). 27 In
fact, the "overwhelming majority"28 of securities-fraud class actions are
brought under section 10(b) and its implementing regulation, Rule
lOb-5. The SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5 pursuant to the authority
that the Exchange Act grants the agency to issue rules and regulations
that it deems "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors. ' 29 Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 together
prohibit manipulation or deception in the offer or sale of any
security.30
25 Section 12(a) (2) provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who ... offers or sells a security... by the use of any means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or
of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which in-
cludes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not
knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the bur-
den of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable ... to
the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or
in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the considera-
tion paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any
income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages
if he no longer owns the security.
Id. § 771(a).
26 Section 17(a) provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securi-
ties.., by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or commu-
nication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails, directly or
indirectly- (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or (2)
to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading; or (3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon the purchaser.
Id. § 77q(a).
27 See Kun Young Chang, Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws: The Need for
the Clear and Restrained Scope of Extraterritorial Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 89, 93 (2003).
28 Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship
Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule lOb-5, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1301, 1302 (2008).
29 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
30 See id. Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device,
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C. Basic Principles: Securities-Fraud Claims, Fraud-on-the-
Market, and Market Efficiency
To state a claim for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff
must allege each of the following elements: (1) the defendant made a
material misrepresentation or omission; (2) the misrepresentation or
omission was in connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (3)
there was a causal connection between the defendant's material mis-
representation or omission and the plaintiff's loss (referred to as "loss
causation"); (4) the plaintiff relied on the defendant's misrepresenta-
tion or omission; (5) the defendant acted with a wrongful state of
mind (referred to as "scienter"); and (6) the plaintiff suffered eco-
nomic loss. 3 1
1. Reliance in Fraud-on-the-Market Cases
The element of reliance-that is, establishing that the defen-
dant's misrepresentation or omission was a substantial factor in the
purchaser's decision to trade in the defendant's stock-is of particular
importance in the context of securities class actions. An individual
plaintiff bringing a 10b-5 suit may be capable of establishing the reli-
ance prong directly-by showing, for example, that he read and relied
on the defendant's SEC filings containing the alleged misrepresenta-
tion. But in the class-action context, where the class may be com-
posed of thousands of individual plaintiffs, "a requirement of
'individualized' proof [of reliance] by each plaintiff would be proce-
durally impossible."3 2 Thus, the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levin-
son33 held that the requirement of reliance in a securities-fraud class
action under section 10(b) and Rule IOb-5 could be satisfied using the
"fraud-on-the-market" theory. 3 4 Under this theory, plaintiffs need not
overcome the practically insurmountable hurdle of proving individual
reliance on a defendant's misstatement or omission. Rather, in a
fraud-on-the-market case, plaintiffs may invoke a rebuttable presump-
tion of reliance.3 5
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a ma-
terial fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
31 See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
32 Buxbaum, supra note 14, at 44.
33 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
34 See id. at 243-50.
35 See id. at 250.
[Vol. 95:627
FRAUD ON THE GLOBAL MARKET
2. Market Efficiency
To better understand the rationale behind affording plaintiffs
this presumption, which significantly eases their burden of proof, one
must examine the concept of market efficiency. According to the Ba-
sic Court, plaintiffs may invoke the presumption of reliance only if
they prove that the corporate defendant's shares "traded on an effi-
cient market."3 6 Although the Court provided no express definition,
an "efficient market" is generally defined as "a market where there are
large numbers of rational, profit-maximizers actively competing, with
each trying to predict future market values of individual securities,
and where important current information is almost freely available to
all participants." 37 The efficient-market hypothesis assumes that "'in
an open and developed securities market, the price of a company's
stock is determined by the available material information regarding
the company and its business."' 38 Put somewhat differently, the hy-
pothesis states that, at any given time, securities prices in an efficient
market fully reflect all publicly available information, including infor-
mation regarding events that have already occurred and events that
the market expects to take place in the future. 39 Accordingly, fraudu-
lent misstatements or omissions about a security, if such information
is disseminated in an efficient market-for example, the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the NASDAQ-will be reflected in the
market price for that security.
The efficient-market hypothesis thus forms the basis for the Basic
"fraud-on-the-market" doctrine:
Misleading statements will . . . defraud purchasers of stock even if
the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements .... The
causal connection between the defendants' fraud and the plaintiffs'
purchase of stock in such a case is no less significant than in a case
of direct reliance on misrepresentations. 40
In sum, the presumption of reliance in an efficient market is logical
because investors who transact in securities at prices set by the market
36 Id. at 248 n.27 ("The Court of Appeals [below] held that in order to invoke the
presumption, a plaintiff must allege and prove: (1) that the defendant made public misrep-
resentations; (2) that the misrepresentations were material; (3) that the shares were traded
on an efficient market; (4) that the misrepresentations would induce a reasonable, relying
investor to misjudge the value of the shares; and (5) that the plaintiff traded the shares
between the time the misrepresentations were made and the time the truth was revealed.
Given today's decision regarding the definition of materiality as to preliminary merger
discussions, elements (2) and (4) may collapse into one." (citation omitted)).
37 Eugene F. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 55
(Sept.-Oct. 1965), reprinted in RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. ScoTrr, ECONOMICS OF
CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION, 156, 157 (1980).
38 Basic, 485 U.S. at 241 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986)).
39 See Fama, supra note 37, at 157.
40 Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-42 (quoting Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160-61).
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do so in reliance on the integrity of those prices; because publicly avail-
able information is reflected in market price, investors' reliance on
misrepresentations by the issuer may be presumed in a Rule lOb-5
case. 41 Thus, the fundamental assumption behind the fraud-on-the-
market theory is that placing an efficient market between the buyer
and seller obviates the need to prove individualized reliance. 42
D. Statutory Silence as to Extraterritorial Application
Currently, the federal securities laws do not expressly define the
extent to which they apply outside the territory of the United States.4 3
The Securities Act, for example, in its provision on jurisdiction, pro-
vides only that
[t] he district courts of the United States ... shall have jurisdiction
of offenses and violations under this subchapter and under the
rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission in respect
thereto .. .of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to en-
force any liability or duty created by this subchapter. Any such suit
or action may be brought in the district wherein the defendant is
found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, or in the district
where the offer or sale took place, if the defendant participated
therein, and process in such cases may be served in any other dis-
trict of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defen-
dant may be found.4 4
The Exchange Act is similarly vague as to its application to for-
eign claims and cross-border transactions. 45 Section 10(b) "makes no
overt mention of securities violations involving foreigners" 46 but
merely refers to "'any person' who uses interstate commerce. '47
Some scholars have pointed out that this silence leads to two opposing
interpretations regarding the law's transnational reach: one argument
reasons that nothing in the statutory language of section 10(b) autho-
rizes U.S. courts to give the Exchange Act extraterritorial force, while
a second argument reads the Act implicitly to provide for broad extra-
41 See id. at 247.
42 See Murray & Pesso, supra note 22, at 387-88.
43 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
44 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2006).
45 See, e.g., Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1995) ("It is well
recognized that the Securities Exchange Act is silent as to its extraterritorial application.");
Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (referring to the Ex-
change Act as "relatively barren" and noting that it provides "no specific indications of
when American federal courts have jurisdiction over securities law claims arising from ex-
traterritorial transactions"); Buxbaum, supra note 14, at 18-19; Savett, supra note 14, at
203; see also Katherine J. Fick, Such Stuff as Laws Are Made on: Interpreting the Exchange Act to
Reach Transnational Fraud, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 441, 447 (2001).
46 Fick, supra note 45, at 449.
47 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1994 & Supp. 2000)).
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territorial application because it defines "interstate commerce" to in-
clude commerce "'between any foreign country and any State.' ,,48
II
TRADITIONAL JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO SUBJECT-MATtER
JURISDICTION UNDER FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
Courts have not given credence to either of these text-based argu-
ments. 49 In fact, "[n]umerous courts have candidly recognized that
the extraterritorial application of securities laws involves policy consid-
erations and the courts' bestjudgment rather than clear statutory gui-
dance. '50 Faced with this "insurmountable textual ambiguity," courts
have developed two tests, the effects test and the conduct test, in an
attempt to give effect to the supposed intent of the enacting legisla-
ture and to determine whether the exercise of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion in a particular case is proper.51 This Part sets forth the
requirements of the effects test and conduct test, including a discus-
sion of the different ways courts have applied them. What emerges is
a mess of jurisdictional standards. Perhaps, then, it is no surprise that
courts apply the tests unpredictably and even arbitrarily in some cases.
Or perhaps courts are beginning to view the tests as increasingly irrel-
evant as concerns about jurisdictional overreach take precedence.
A. The Effects Test
Under the effects test, courts focus their attention on the impact
of foreign conduct on U.S. investors and markets. 5 2 This test was orig-
inally articulated in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,53 the first major securities-
fraud case to extend subject-matter jurisdiction extraterritorially. In
Schoenbaum-a shareholder derivative suit, not a class action-an
American shareholder of a Canadian corporation brought suit under
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, alleging that the corporation's di-
48 Id. at 450 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78c(17)). For a discussion of the second argument,
see John D. Kelly, Note, Let There Be Fraud (Abroad): A Proposal for a New U.S. Jurisprudence
with Regard to the Extraterritorial Application of the Anti-Fraud Provisions of the 1933 and 1934
Securities Acts, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 477, 480 (1997). One proponent of the second
construction of the Exchange Act is Norimasa Murano, Extraterritorial Application of the An-
tifraud Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 2 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 298, 299 (1984)
("The statutory framework of the 1934 Act clearly gives the federal courts subject-matter
jurisdiction over extraterritorial securities transactions.").
49 See Fick, supra note 45, at 451 ("Courts have not taken the jurisdictional implica-
tions of either text-based argument to their logical extreme.").
50 Torpey et al., supra note 9, at 3.
51 Fick, supra note 45, at 452.
52 See In re Rhodia S.A. Sec. Litig., 531 F. Supp. 2d 527, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing
Eur. & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118, 128
(2d Cir. 1998)).
53 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
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rectors conspired to defraud the corporation by failing to disclose ma-
terial information in order to transact in treasury shares at an
artificially low market price.54 Even though "the sales in question...
took place in Canada between foreign buyers and sellers, '55 the Sec-
ond Circuit reversed the district court's holding on subject-matter ju-
risdiction and concluded that the plaintiff had rebutted the
traditional presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction 56 by show-
ing that the defendants' foreign conduct adversely affected U.S. pur-
chasers and markets. 5 7 The court predicated this holding on its belief
that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial ap-
plication in the interest of protecting American investors. 58 The ef-
fects test has since been supplemented by substantiality and specificity
requirements: a court may properly exercise subject-matter jurisdic-
tion over a securities-fraud case if conduct outside the United States
has a substantial effect on specific American investors.5 9
54 Id. at 204-06.
55 Id. at 206.
56 There is a general presumption in statutory interpretation against applying con-
gressional legislation extraterritorially. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n
v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) ("It is a longstanding principle of Ameri-
can law 'that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."' (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v.
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949))). Indeed, in a seminal case on the extraterritorial appli-
cation of U.S. law, F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., an antitrust class action
brought on behalf of foreign and domestic purchasers of vitamins, the Supreme Court
held that the Sherman Act was not applicable to claims based on foreign harm. 542 U.S.
155, 164 (2004). The Court based its conclusion principally on the concept of comity,
relying on the rule of statutory construction that requires courts to construe statutes to
avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations. See id. at
164-73. A distinction between Empagran and securities class actions such as NAB, however,
is that Empagran treated the antitrust laws as "a legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust
injury that foreign anticompetitive conduct has caused," id. at 165, whereas courts deciding
securities class actions have long acknowledged that the securities laws are designed not
only to prevent fraud affecting domestic purchasers but also to prevent the United States
from being used "as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export," Itoba
Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
57 Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206.
58 Id. ("We believe that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial
application in order to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities
on American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the effects of
improper foreign transactions in American securities.").
59 See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[T]here is
subject matter jurisdiction of fraudulent acts relating to securities which are committed
abroad only when these result in injury to purchasers or sellers of those securities in whom
the United States has an interest, not where acts simply have an adverse affect [sic] on the
American economy or American investors generally." (footnotes omitted)); In re Royal
Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 360 (D. Md. 2004) ("Under the
effects test, courts have subject matter jurisdiction over foreign transactions related to se-
curities if the transactions resulted in direct, adverse injury to specific American investors
and parties within the United States. Allegations that the foreign conduct generally af-
fected the U.S. market will not satisfy the effects test." (citations omitted)).
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Although I address this point in more detail below, note for now
only that some courts have suggested that the effects test is not appli-
cable to F-cubed actions. Such courts reason that the effects test fo-
cuses on the adverse impact on American investors; F-cubed claimants,
the argument goes, cannot establish any relationship between their
particular claims and those American effects. 60
B. The Conduct Test
Under the conduct test, courts focus their attention not on for-
eign conduct that adversely affects domestic traders and markets but
rather on the extent and nature of the defendant's U.S.-based conduct
and whether such conduct was part of a fraudulent scheme resulting
in losses to investors abroad.61 Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v.
Maxwell, 62 a case in which American and British plaintiffs sued British
defendants under section 10 (b) of the Exchange Act, was the first case
to apply what would later become known as the conduct test. In
Leasco, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had conspired to
cause them to buy securities of a British corporation at prices in excess
of their true value. 63 Unlike Schoenbaum, where fraudulent acts com-
mitted abroad harmed American investors, Leasco involved what the
court described as a "significant" or "extensive" amount of domestic
conduct-sufficient, in the court's view, to confer subject-matter juris-
diction.64 Again, the Leasco court predicated its holding on its inter-
pretation of congressional intent:
Still we must ask ourselves whether, if Congress had thought about
the point, it would not have wished to protect an American investor
if a foreigner comes to the United States and fraudulently induces
him to purchase foreign securities abroad-a purpose which its
words can fairly be held to embrace.65
Leasco thus provides that the exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction in
a transnational securities-fraud case must be supported by "extensive"
U.S. conduct by defendants that forms an "essential link" in the chain
of causation resulting in plaintiffs' losses. 66 The Second Circuit has
revisited the conduct test myriad times since Leasco and has refined
the test into its current form, which requires that "substantial acts"
60 See infra note 107; see also In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 346, 369
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("The effects test.., has no bearing in an action involving the claims of
foreign purchasers of a foreign company's securities on foreign exchanges . ).
61 See Buxbaum, supra note 14, at 23.
62 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
63 Id. at 1330.
64 Id. at 1334-35.
65 Id. at 1337. The court then concluded: "[W]e think it tips the scales in favor of
applicability when substantial misrepresentations were made in the United States." Id.
66 Id. at 1335.
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relating to the fraud occur in the United States. 67 This U.S.-based
conduct must (1) be more than merely preparatory to the fraud and
(2) directly cause the plaintiffs loss. 68 Although this Note uses the
Second Circuit's current version of the test as a basis for discussion,
one should note that there is a substantial division among the circuits
on how precisely to apply the conduct test.69
C. Effects and Conduct Combined?
Traditionally, a court must find either the effects test or the con-
duct test satisfied in order to properly exercise subject-matter jurisdic-
tion.70  Nevertheless, according to some courts, subject-matter
jurisdiction may be based on a combination of the effects and conduct
tests.71 As the Second Circuit explained in Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC,
"an admixture or combination of the two often gives a better picture
of whether there is sufficient United States involvement to justify the
exercise ofjurisdiction by an American court."72 It is at least arguable
that allowing some combination of the two tests to satisfy the require-
ments for subject-matter jurisdiction necessarily relaxes plaintiffs' bur-
67 See Calhoun, supra note 23, at 709.
68 See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd. (NAB I/), 547 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2008)
("Under the 'conduct' component, subject matter jurisdiction exists if activities in this
country were more than merely preparatory to a fraud and culpable acts or omissions
occurring here directly caused losses to investors abroad." (citations omitted)); In re
Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 381 F. Supp. 2d 158, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Under the
'conduct test' . . . this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of foreign
investors abroad (1) if the defendant's conduct in the United States was more than merely
preparatory to the fraud, and [(2)] particular acts or culpable failures to act within the
United States directly caused losses to foreign investors abroad." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
69 See, e.g., In re CP Ships Ltd. Sec. Litig., 578 F.3d 1306, 1313 n.8 (11th Cir. 2009)
(acknowledging "less stringent formulation[s]" of the conduct test than the Second Cir-
cuit's approach); In re Cable & Wireless, PLC, Sec. Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 749, 757-58 (E.D.
Va. 2004) ("Other circuits in the Courts of Appeals are split as to how to apply the conduct
test."). Michael Calhoun likewise explains that "the circuits disagree on the precise degree
of domestic conduct required to grant subject matter jurisdiction to domestic federal
courts." Calhoun, supra note 23, at 697. He outlines three different approaches taken by
the courts-a "restrictive" approach, a "broad" approach, and a "balancing" approach. Id.
at 698-719.
70 See In reAstraZeneca Sec. Litig., 559 F. Supp. 2d 453, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("A plain-
tiff must satisfy one of two tests to establish subject matter jurisdiction over transnational
securities fraud claims." (emphasis added)); Tri-Star Farms Ltd. v. Marconi, PLC, 225 F.
Supp. 2d 567, 573 (W.D. Pa. 2002) ("Satisfaction of either test may independently establish
jurisdiction."); see also S.E.C. v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 195 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that,
because jurisdiction existed under the conduct test, the court need not reach the question
of whether the effects test provided an independent basis for exercising jurisdiction).
71 See Fick, supra note 45, at 459 ("While courts conventionally apply either the con-
duct or the effects test when deciding whether to confer jurisdiction, the Second Circuit
has held that these inquiries are not mutually exclusive.").
72 Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995).
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den of proof, resulting in the expansion of U.S. law. 73 Perhaps
recognizing this fact, some courts have required that plaintiffs not
only fully satisfy one of the tests but also establish "additional tipping
factors" beyond the requirements of the test itself that favor the exer-
cise of jurisdiction.74 That is, under some circumstances, plaintiffs
must do more than merely satisfy one of the tests. As one court
explained:
That misrepresentation and reliance may occur on U.S. soil and still
fail to implicate federal jurisdiction emphasizes that a simple
mechanical application of the jurisdictional tests is insufficient. A
proper analysis should focus on the policy considerations that led to
the extraterritorial application of these laws in the first place-pro-
tecting or punishing U.S.-parties and markets. 75
Nevertheless, many courts reject the "tipping factors" approach and
find the search for additional tipping factors unnecessary if a tradi-
tional jurisdictional test is plainly satisfied.7 6 Thus, anyone looking at
the case law in this area is likely to come away with a sense that courts
simply engage in an "I know it when I see it"77 approach to subject-
matter jurisdiction in these cases.
D. The Tests as Applied: Arbitrary Line Drawing
Although articulation of the effects and conduct tests is easy, re-
cent case law demonstrates that their application is anything but
straightforward. 78 Or, perhaps, courts bungle what would otherwise
be a straightforward application of the tests by focusing on the wrong
73 See Buxbaum, supra note 14, at 25 ("Such an approach might be used to expand the
reach of U.S. law, since courts could view the jurisdictional test as satisfied by a combina-
tion of conduct and effects that standing alone would not be sufficient.").
74 See, e.g., Interbrew S.A. v. Edperbrascan Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 425, 432 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) ("Thus, the question is whether, in addition to [defendant's] U.S.-based activity,
there is 'some additional factor tipping the scales in favor of our jurisdiction ....' (quot-
ing Eur. & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118,
129 (2d Cir. 1998))).
75 Id. at 429.
76 See, e.g., In re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig., 58 F. Supp. 2d 62, 75-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
("The fraudulent activity allegedly engaged in by [defendant] within the United States
stands in sharp contrast to the mere filing of SEC statements with no intention to victimize
American shareholders, suggesting that there may be no need to search for additional
'tipping factors' as there was in Interbrew.").
77 Justice Potter Stewart famously stated in his concurring opinion inJacobellis v. Ohio,
a case about obscenity, "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I
understand to be embraced within that shorthand description ["hard-core pornography"];
and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it....
378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
78 See, e.g., In reAlstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 346, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Ar-
ticulation of the rule is easy. The rub, like God and the devil, is in the details of its applica-
tion."); see also In re Nat'l Austl. Bank Sec. Litig. (NAB 1), No. 03-6537, 2006 WL 3844465, at




factors, a digression that easily leads to counterintuitive outcomes. To
illustrate the unpredictability with which courts apply the tests in F-
cubed cases, a comparison of two recent cases is useful.
In re National Australia Bank Securities Litigation7 9 involved a class-
action suit under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 by a class of plaintiffs
consisting of both foreign and domestic investors against National
Australia Bank (NAB), its CEO, and certain officers of HomeSide, a
Florida-based NAB subsidiary, which was a mortgage service provider
at the time of its acquisition by NAB in 1998.80 The plaintiffs alleged
that NAB made various false and misleading statements in SEC filings,
in its annual reports, and in statements to the press regarding Home-
Side's operations and its contribution to NAB's overall profitability.81
Moreover, according to the plaintiffs, those statements were based on
financial models for valuing HomeSide's future cash flow that were
known by the defendants to yield unrealistic results.8 2 When, in the
summer and fall of 2001, the defendants announced that the bank
would incur two write-downs due to a recalculation of the value of
HomeSide's servicing rights, and the bank's true financial condition
became clear to the public, the price of NAB ordinary shares on the
Australian market and American Depository Receipts (ADRs) on the
NYSE tumbled.8 3 The plaintiffs alleged a fraudulent scheme whereby
HomeSide falsified the value of its future cash flow in Florida and
then sent the data to NAB in Australia, where NAB personnel incorpo-
rated the information into statements and filings disseminated to the
public.
The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
the claims of non-U.S. residents who purchased their NAB shares
abroad.8 4 The court began its analysis under the effects test. It stated:
To begin, the alleged fraud had very little-if any-demonstrable
effect on the United States market .... Moreover, because the ag-
gregate value of the ADRs represented a mere 1.1% of NAB's nearly
one-and-a-half billion ordinary shares, any effect on the United
States market from the alleged fraud pales in comparison to the
effect on the foreign markets. 85
Finding the effects test unsatisfied, the district court then turned to
the conduct test and rejected the arguments advanced by the plaintiffs
on that front as well. Despite the plaintiffs' allegations of HomeSide's
misconduct in the United States-improperly valuing its future cash
79 NAB 1, 2006 WL 3844465.
80 Id. at *1.
81 Id.
82 Id. at *2.
83 Id.
84 Id. at *3.
85 Id. at *4.
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flow by using a knowingly unreliable valuation model-the court char-
acterized the domestic conduct as merely "a link in the chain of an
alleged overall securities fraud scheme that culminated abroad" and
agreed with the defendants that the securities fraud, if it occurred at
all, took place when NAB distributed the allegedly false information
to foreign purchasers abroad.8 6
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the plaintiffs sought to charac-
terize the domestic conduct as "at very least 'part of a single fraudu-
lent scheme' to inflate [HomeSide's future cash flow] and, in turn,
NAB's stock price"87 and stressed that "the misstatements made in
Australia merely repeated and transmitted false information created
in the United States."88 The plaintiffs argued that the district court
had converted the conduct test into a "from where the misstatements
originated and emanated" test and that this standard would allow for-
eign entities with U.S. subsidiaries to turn a blind eye to their subsidi-
aries' U.S.-based misconduct and enjoy immunity from U.S. securities
laws simply by creating and disseminating their public statements
abroad.89
The Second Circuit, however, affirmed the district court's rul-
ing,90 and its reasoning illustrates the difficulty with which courts ap-
ply the effects and conduct tests. The court began by characterizing
the jurisdictional analysis as a "binary inquiry" that requires a court to
"look to whether the harm was perpetrated here or abroad and
whether it affected domestic markets and investors." 1 Repeatedly
casting the effects and conduct tests as two prongs of the same test,
the court effectively condemned the plaintiffs' argument from the
outset.9 2 The Second Circuit emphasized that the fraudulent state-
ments at issue emanated from NAB's headquarters in Australia, and it
86 Id. at *8.
87 Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 33, Morrison v. Nat'l Austl.
Bank Ltd. (NAB I), 547 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 07-0583-cv) [hereinafter NAB II
Plaintiffs' Brief] (citation omitted).
88 Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2, NAB II, 547 F.3d 167 (No. 07-0583-cv).
89 NAB II Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 87, at 33.
90 NAB II, 547 F.3d at 177.
91 Id. at 171 (emphasis added).
92 Indeed, the court went so far as to indicate that the lack of allegations satisfying the
effects test weighed against the exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 176. As dis-
cussed above, however, courts do not require that plaintiffs satisfy both the effects test and
the conduct test. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. Even courts that require plain-
tiffs to allege "additional tipping factors" to justify the exercise of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion do not treat the effects and conduct tests as "binary." For instance, the court in Europe
& Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London noted that it had previously
"found jurisdiction over a predominantly foreign securities transaction under the conduct
test when, in addition to communications with or meetings in the United States," other
additional tipping factors existed. 147 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 1998). These factors could
take the form of "a transaction on a U.S. exchange, economic activity in the U.S., harm to
a U.S. party, or activity by a U.S. person or entity meriting redress." Id. That is, the court,
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noted "the striking absence of any allegation" by the plaintiffs that
what the defendants did "had any meaningful effect on America's in-
vestors or its capital markets."93 These factors, in the court's view,
merited a decision affirming the district court. The first factor that
the Second Circuit used tojustify its decision-that NAB disseminated
its public statements in Australia-is particularly noteworthy in light
of the plaintiffs' argument that the conduct test is not a "from where
the misstatements originated and emanated" test, and also in light of
previous cases, discussed in more detail below. The court allowed the
place of compilation of the public statements (Australia), rather than
the place of improper conduct (Florida), to determine jurisdiction.
Underlying the court's reasoning was its contention that the focus of
Rule lOb-5 is on "the accuracy of statements to the public" and that
"[e]nsuring the accuracy of such statements is much more central to
the responsibilities of [NAB's] corporate headquarters, which issued
the statements, than to those of HomeSide, which did not."94
The outcome of both NAB decisions is remarkable in comparison
to In re Alstom SA Securities Litigation,9 5 an F-cubed action with very
similar facts, decided the year before NAB I. Alstom involved claims
under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act against a French com-
pany involved in diverse businesses, including rail and marine trans-
portation. 96 Alstom's shares traded on the NYSE, the London Stock
Exchange, and the Paris Exchange. 97 Although the court ultimately
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction the claims of the F-
cubed plaintiffs as to one of two allegedly fraudulent schemes (the
"Marine/Turbine Fraud"), it retained subject-matter jurisdiction over
the claims of those purchasers as to another allegedly fraudulent
scheme (the "ATI Fraud").98 The following discussion focuses on the
court's analysis with respect to the ATI Fraud, as its reasoning stands
in stark contrast to the later reasoning of the NAB courts.
The ATI Fraud concerned allegations by the plaintiffs that Alstom
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently incorporated into its financial
statements fraudulent results that were based on the underreporting
of costs on railcar construction projects at ATI, a wholly owned subsid-
iary of Alstom located in New York.99 According to the plaintiffs, the
purpose of this nondisclosure was to cause ATI to appear more profit-
even while requiring something above and beyond satisfaction of the conduct test, did not
go so far as to require a simultaneous satisfaction of the effects test.
93 NAB II, 547 F.3d at 176.
94 Id.
95 406 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
96 See id. at 353.
97 See id.
98 See id. at 397.
99 See id. at 387.
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able than the company's other sectors.10 0 In essence, the plaintiffs
argued that the nondisclosure of costs associated with the ATI railcar-
construction contracts in SEC filings and other statements made those
statements misleading as to Alstom's financial condition and artifi-
cially inflated the price of Alstom's securities. 10 1
First, as to the effects test, the court early in its opinion held the
test to be wholly inapplicable as a source of subject-matterjurisdiction
over the claims of F-cubed plaintiffs. 10 2 This holding stands in con-
trast to the NAB H court's later characterization of the subject-matter
inquiry as "binary" and its implication that, had the plaintiffs alleged
sufficient adverse effects on American purchasers, their case would
have been stronger. The Alstom court, however, saw a "piggyback"
problem with applying the effects test in an F-cubed action. The court
stated:
Plaintiffs suggest that this Court look to the harm the alleged frauds
at Alstom caused domestic investors and the drastic decline in the
share price of Alstom ADSs on the NYSE, and consider these facts in
determining whether the Court has jurisdiction over the claims of
an entirely separate set of individuals: the foreign investors who pur-
chased their Alstom shares on foreign markets. The Court does not
agree with Lead Plaintiffs that the foreign purchasers of Alstom
shares listed on exchanges abroad may piggyback on the harm
caused by the alleged fraud to investors and markets in the United
States and thus bring their claims in United States courts.1 03
Turning then to the conduct test, the Alstom court retained subject-
matter jurisdiction over F-cubed claims as to the ATI Fraud. The
court's reasoning, to reiterate, is remarkable in juxtaposition with the
later reasoning of the NAB H court resolving a case with nearly identi-
cal facts. The Alstom court reasoned that the allegedly fraudulent un-
derreporting of costs occurred in the United States at ATI's New York
office. 104 ATI concealed mounting costs associated with its railcar
contracts and sent the inaccurate financial data to Alstom's headquar-
ters in France, where the false or misleading information was incorpo-
rated into Alstom's corporate financial statements. 10 5 Consequently,
the Alstom court, unlike the NAB H!court, concluded that the allegedly
fraudulent conduct occurred within the United States:
ATI is located in New York and the fraud, if any in fact occurred,
was concocted and executed within ATI.... The false documents
may have been sent to Alstom headquarters in France and incorpo-
100 See id.
101 See id. at 387-88.
102 See id. at 369.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 394.
105 Id. at 394-95.
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rated into the Company's financial reports, but[ ] ... the mailing of
the fraudulent documents for publication outside of the United
States does not render the conduct in the United States any less of a
cause of plaintiffs' losses. 0 6
Thus, although the NAB II court allowed the place of compilation of
the public statements to determine jurisdiction, the Alstom court fo-
cused on the place of improper conduct. As the foregoing makes
clear, courts do not apply the effects and conduct tests predictably.
Rather, courts manage to reach opposite outcomes, even in cases in-
volving comparable claims and facts.
III
APPLYING A "FRAUD-ON-THE-GLOBAL-MARKET" THEORY TO
SUPPORT EXERCISING SUBJECT-MATI-ER
JURISDICTION IN F-CUBED ACTIONS
This Part seeks to link the foregoing discussions of market effi-
ciency, fraud-on-the-market, and judicial treatment of subject-matter
jurisdiction by examining a recent argument made by plaintiffs: that a
"fraud-on-the-global-market" theory ought to support the exercise of
subject-matter jurisdiction in F-cubed actions on the basis of the con-
duct test. This Part concludes that the "fraud-on-the-global-market"
argument, though almost universally rejected by courts, not only is
viable but also almost necessarily follows from the Supreme Court's
decision in Basic v. Levinson and ought to be accepted by courts to
support the exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction in F-cubed actions.
The opposite conclusion forces courts into the illogical position of
accepting the efficiency of the global market for an issuer's securities
for some purchasers but not for others. Moreover, to reject the theory
by citing concerns about jurisdictional "overreach" (as many courts
do) makes little sense because no one quarrels with the extraterrito-
rial application of the securities laws for plaintiffs who can show direct
reliance.
A. The "Fraud-on-the-Global-Market" Argument in Context
Foreign purchasers typically seek to establish subject-matter juris-
diction under the conduct test.10 7 As discussed above, plaintiffs do so
106 Id. at 396.
107 See Pension Comm. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 592 F. Supp. 2d 608, 620 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) ("Where the court is determining whether the claims of foreign plaintiffs should be
dismissed, the relevant analysis is the conduct test."); see also supra text accompanying notes
102-03 (highlighting the Alstom court's position that the effects tests is inapplicable as a
source of subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims of F-cubed plaintiffs). Hannah Bux-
baum has noted that arguments by foreign investors seeking to establish subject-matter
jurisdiction on the basis of the effects test have "uniformly failed" and that "[d]ue to the
difficulties in satisfying the effects test, most investors whose claims arise from foreign-
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by alleging that a defendant engaged in certain conduct in the United
States-for instance, filing an SEC statement containing a misrepre-
sentation or omission-that materially advanced the defendant's
fraudulent scheme and caused the plaintiffs' losses. Using the Second
Circuit's standard as a model, this argument requires plaintiffs to
show that the defendant's U.S.-based conduct (1) was more than
merely preparatory to the fraud and (2) directly caused the plaintiffs'
losses.' 08 The first prong focuses on the amount and nature of the
defendant's acts in the United States. The second prong requires
plaintiffs to establish causation through reliance on the defendant's
misstatements. Thus, F-cubed plaintiffs have proposed-with little
success-that a fraud-on-the-global-market' 0 9 theory ought to estab-
lish reliance and satisfy the conduct test in cases involving cross-bor-
der transactions in much the same way that the traditional fraud-on-
the-market theory operates to create a rebuttable presumption of reli-
ance, as established in Basic."t0 No doubt, this argument draws on the
efficient-market hypothesis, expanded into the global arena: to link
misrepresentations in the United States with effects on securities
prices abroad, F-cubed plaintiffs argue that information publicly avail-
able in one country will affect the price of the issuer's securities in
other countries as well.
In re AstraZeneca Securities Litigation"' is a particularly illustrative
case. A typical F-cubed class action, AstraZeneca involved claims under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 against AstraZeneca, a U.K.-based phar-
maceutical company, with the plaintiffs alleging that an anticoagulant
drug developed by AstraZeneca was not as safe or effective as the com-
pany's statements suggested and that certain risks associated with the
drug were not disclosed to the public." 2 These alleged nondisclo-
sures and misstatements, the plaintiffs argued, caused the price of As-
market transactions rely on U.S. conduct as a jurisdictional basis." Buxbaum, supra note
14, at 42, 43. As one court explained, foreign plaintiffs who purchased a defendant-issuer's
securities on a foreign exchange typically have trouble establishing subject-matter jurisdic-
tion on the basis of the effects test because they cannot show that the relevant U.S. effects
have any relation to their claims: "These investors were not American investors, they did
not purchase their securities on an American exchange, and they did not suffer the effects
of [defendant's] alleged conduct within the United States. Therefore, there is no domes-
tic effect of [defendant's] conduct in relation to these plaintiffs." Tri-Star Farms Ltd. v. Mar-
coni, PLC, 225 F. Supp. 2d 567, 573 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (emphasis added).
108 See Calhoun, supra note 23, at 697-98, 709-13.
109 See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 251,
262 (2006) ("[The F-cubed plaintiffs] suggested a sort of 'fraud on the global market'
theory: even if they did not rely directly on the fraudulent SEC filings .... the statements
in those filings would necessarily have affected the price of shares in the foreign
markets.").
110 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988).
111 559 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
112 Id. at 456-57.
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traZeneca's stock, which traded on the NYSE, the London Stock
Exchange, and the Stockholm Exchange, 113 to be artificially inflated,
so that when the FDA ultimately revealed these risks and denied ap-
proval of the drug, the plaintiffs suffered losses resulting from the
stock-price decline. 114 The plaintiffs argued that the court had sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction over the claims of F-cubed members of the
class on the basis of the conduct test. As to the first prong of the
conduct test, the plaintiffs alleged that numerous misleading press re-
leases were produced at AstraZeneca's office in Delaware, that several
alleged misrepresentations took place at the Annual Business Review
in Delaware, that the defendants filed a misleading annual report with
the SEC, and that the defendants conducted several meetings with
analysts and investors in the United States. 1 5 To satisfy the second
prong of the conduct test, the plaintiffs, rather than alleging specific
reliance on the defendant's fraudulent acts in the United States, in-
voked the fraud-on-the-market doctrine with a global twist: they ar-
gued that AstraZeneca stock traded in an efficient global market,
shown by allegations that the stock prices on all three exchanges
"tracked one another" during the relevant period and that "As-
traZeneca's stock price dropped materially on all three exchanges
when the FDA exposed the previously undisclosed data about [the
drug] and declined to approve the drug."'"16 Moreover, because As-
traZeneca was followed by analysts at major brokerage firms whose
reports were publicly available, "the market for AstraZeneca's securi-
ties promptly digested current information regarding AstraZeneca
from all publicly available sources and reflected such information in
AstraZeneca's stock price on each exchange upon which it was
traded."' 17 Thus, even if foreign purchasers had not relied directly on
AstraZeneca's alleged misstatements, given the efficiency of the global
market for AstraZeneca stock, fraudulent misstatements or omissions
made in the United States would necessarily affect the price of As-
traZeneca stock on foreign exchanges and cause harm to individuals
who purchased their shares abroad. The plaintiffs hoped that this ar-
gument would satisfy the "direct causation" prong of the conduct test.
B. Fraud-on-the-Global-Market Rejected
Despite finding that the plaintiffs had satisfied the first prong of
the conduct test by adequately alleging that AstraZeneca's U.S. con-
113 Id.
114 Id. at 457.
115 Id. at 465.
116 Plaintiffs' Opposition to All Defendants' Motions to Dismiss the Amended Com-
plaint at 37, AstraZeneca, 559 F. Supp. 2d 453 (No. 05-CV-2688) [hereinafter AstraZeneca
Motion to Dismiss Opposition].
117 Id. at 42.
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duct was more than merely preparatory to the fraud, the AstraZeneca
court rejected the plaintiffs' suggestion that a fraud-on-the-global-mar-
ket theory was sufficient to satisfy the second prong.118 Accordingly,
the court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction the claims of
foreigners who acquired AstraZeneca stock on foreign exchanges. 119
The court noted simply:
Courts that have rejected a global fraud-on-the-market theory have
not done so because they believe the theory does not hold true on a
global level, but rather because of a concern that allowing foreign
purchasers on foreign exchanges to plead reliance in this manner
would extend the jurisdictional reach of the United States securities
laws too far.120
Thus, even in the face of a robust argument in support of the the-
ory-indeed, the court conceded the plaintiffs' "valid point" about
market efficiency121-the court's decision turned on its concern
about jurisdictional overreach. The question of how far our securities
laws ought to reach is no doubt a valid inquiry. Nevertheless, the
court misdirected this concern by expressing it in response to plain-
tiffs' fraud-on-the-global-market argument, an argument made to sat-
isfy the second prong of the conduct test (the "direct causation"
prong). By finding the first prong (the "more than merely prepara-
tory" prong) satisfied, the court ought to have allayed any concern it
had about jurisdictional overreach. That is, by finding the U.S. con-
duct sufficient to satisfy the first prong, the court should have moved
on to the second prong and considered the fraud-on-the-global mar-
ket argument free of any worry about jurisdictional overreach.
Another representative case is In re Baan Co. Securities Litigation,122
an F-cubed action that predates AstraZeneca by several years but in-
volved a similar (and similarly unsuccessful) attempt by plaintiffs to
advance the fraud-on-the-global-market argument. Remarkable, how-
ever, is the absence of any analysis of market efficiency by the court.
In Baan, the plaintiffs brought a section 10(b) action against a Dutch
corporation whose securities traded both in the United States and
abroad.' 23 The class alleged that the defendant company inflated its
reported revenue and earnings through a "consignment sale[ ]"
scheme in which the company booked revenue on sales it knew were
not final. 124 Moreover, according to the plaintiffs, the company failed
to disclose that the consignment sales were being treated as revenue
118 AstraZeneca, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 465-66.
119 Id. at 466.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 103 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2000).
123 Id. at 4.
124 Id. at 6.
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in annual and quarterly reports filed with the SEC, in press releases
disseminated over the internet, and in statements to the press. 125 The
plaintiffs argued that, because "Baan shares worldwide traded in tan-
dem on efficient markets," fraudulent conduct perpetrated in the
United States would "simultaneously manifest itself here and
abroad."'126 Thus, misstatements contained in U.S. filings would nec-
essarily affect both the price of Baan's stock on foreign exchanges,
causing harm to individuals who purchased their securities abroad,
and the price of Baan's stock on domestic exchanges, causing harm to
individuals purchasing in the United States.
The court in Baan rejected the plaintiffs' argument and granted
the motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matterjurisdiction as to those
plaintiffs who neither resided in the United States nor purchased
Baan stock in the United States.' 27 In a hasty dismissal, the court
stated merely that "employing [a fraud-on-the-global-market] doctrine
to fulfill the requirements of the conduct test would extend the reach
of the 1934 Act too far."'128 Thus, like the AstraZeneca court, the court
here too was principally concerned with congressional intent as to the
extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act. Again, although this
concern is certainly valid, the court misdirected its concern by discuss-
ing it in the context of the "direct causation" prong of the conduct
test, rather than addressing it as part of the first prong. In using juris-
dictional overreach as a response to the plaintiffs' fraud-on-the-global-
market argument, the court simply gave itself permission to dismiss
the argument without considering it at all. Indeed, nowhere in its
opinion does the court even mention market efficiency. This omis-
sion is surprising considering that the plaintiffs alleged in their com-
plaint1 29 and argued in opposition to the motion to dismiss130 that the
worldwide market for Baan securities was an efficient one. As proof,
the plaintiffs noted that "Baan shares worldwide traded in tandem"1 3t
125 Id.
126 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants Baan Company, William 0.
Grabe, David G. Hodgson, Amal M.Johnson, Tom C. Tinsley and N.M. Wagenaar's Motion
to Dismiss the Consolidated Amended Complaint at 26, Baan, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1 (No. 98-
CV-02465) [hereinafter Baan Motion to Dismiss Opposition].
127 Baan, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 4.
128 Id. at 10. In another F-cubed action, Tri-Star Farms Ltd. v. Marconi, PLC, 225 F.
Supp. 2d 567, 579, 581 (W.D. Pa. 2002), the district court cited Boan and, using nearly
identical language, summarily granted defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction the claims of foreign purchasers. The court simply stated that
"[e]mploying the 'fraud-on-the-market' doctrine to satisfy the conduct test in this type of
class action lawsuit involving overwhelmingly foreign transactions would extend the juris-
dictional reach of the securities laws too far." Id. at 579.
129 See Amended Consolidated Complaint for Violation of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 at 64, Baan, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1 (No. 98-CV-02465) [hereinafter Baan Complaint].
130 Baan Motion to Dismiss Opposition, supra note 126.
131 Id. at 26.
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and that Baan stock was followed by securities analysts at major bro-
kerage firms whose reports entered the public marketplace. 13 2 In
sum, according to the plaintiffs, "the market for Baan securities
promptly digested current information regarding Baan from all pub-
licly available sources and reflected such information in Baan's securi-
ties prices. Under these circumstances, all purchasers of Baan
securities during the Class Period suffered similar injury."133 Despite
such arguments, the court rejected the fraud-on-the-global-market ar-
gument without any discussion of market efficiency.
C. Viability of the Fraud-on-the-Global-Market Argument
Given the interconnectedness of today's securities markets, the
fraud-on-the-global-market theory should be a viable argument. In es-
tablishing the appropriateness of applying a rebuttable presumption
of reliance supported by the traditional fraud-on-the-market theory,
the Basic Court stated: "The modern securities markets, literally in-
volving millions of shares changing hands daily, differ from the face-
to-face transactions contemplated by early fraud cases, and our under-
standing of Rule 10b-5's reliance requirement must encompass these
differences. '134 Why, then, should our understanding of Rule lOb-5's
reliance requirement not take into account the fact that securities
transactions now involve the cross-border exchange of millions of
shares every day? In fact, it is illogical to assume that the reasoning in
Basic does not extend to a worldwide market for a particular issuer's
stock when the worldwide market has the necessary indicators for effi-
ciency. The Basic Court premised its holding on the understanding
that, in an open and developed securities market, the propagation of
material misstatements or the withholding of material information af-
fects the price of securities. 135 If a market is open and developed, this
economic principle surely holds true whether that open and devel-
oped market is wholly domestic or encompasses exchanges in more
than one country. As the plaintiffs in AstraZeneca argued, "if securities
reacted to information only within the United States, global traders
would take advantage of the price differential and buy on one ex-
change to sell on another."1 36
The current financial crisis is proof positive that the market effect
of information disseminated in the United States is not restricted to
U.S. securities markets. As discussed above, news that Lehman Broth-
132 Baan Complaint, supra note 129.
133 Id. at 64-65.
134 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243-44 (1988) (footnote omitted).
135 See id. (citing Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir. 1986)).




ers would fail leaked on a Sunday, a day when markets around the
world were closed. 137 Global markets reacted to the news upon open-
ing the very next morning, and Lehman's demise turned out to be a
trigger for a global financial crisis. The financial crisis makes plain
that in today's interconnected world, information travels rapidly and
can affect securities prices around the globe, no matter where that
information is disseminated. Courts, however, by dismissing the
claims of F-cubed plaintiffs for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, ig-
nore the global nature of the securities markets.
One particular problem with U.S. courts' almost systematic rejec-
tion of the fraud-on-the-global-market doctrine is that any rule re-
stricting the doctrine to domestic markets creates a logical logjam.
Courts-and defendants, for that matter-in F-cubed actions rou-
tinely concede the courts' subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims
of three distinct investor groups: (1) U.S. residents who purchased
their shares on a U.S. exchange; (2) non-U.S. residents who pur-
chased their shares on a U.S. exchange; and (3) U.S. residents who
purchased their shares on a foreign exchange. 138 Thus, courts accept
that the fraud-on-the-market theory suffices to establish reliance for
some investors whose claims arise from foreign transactions (for ex-
ample, those in Group 3, U.S. residents purchasing abroad). This rea-
soning puts courts in the illogical position of finding that the global
market is efficient for U.S. purchasers but not for many foreign pur-
chasers.1 39 Indeed, in In re Bayer AG Securities Litigation,140 the court
found itself in this very position after dismissing the claims of foreign
137 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
138 See, e.g., In re China Life Sec. Litig., No. 04 Civ. 2112, 2008 WL 4066919, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2008) ("The court rules that it has no subject matter jurisdiction over
foreigners who purchased on the Hong Kong exchange. As to purchasers on the NewYork
Stock Exchange or any other exchange in the United States, or Americans who purchased
anywhere, there is subject matter jurisdiction."); In re SCOR Holding (Switzerland) AG
Litig., 537 F. Supp. 2d 556, 560 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("It has not been suggested that this
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of U.S. residents who purchased
Converium shares on the SWX [Swiss Exchange], or over the claims of any person who
purchased Converium ADSs on the NYSE.... [T]his Court does indeed possess such
jurisdiction."); Tri-Star Farms Ltd. v. Marconi, PLC, 225 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571 n.6 (W.D. Pa.
2002) ("Defendants do not challenge the court's subject-matterjurisdiction over the claims
of the City of Miami Fire Fighters' and Police Officers' Retirement Trust Fund or the puta-
tive class of persons who purchased Marconi ADRs on the NASDAQ market during the
class period. This would include foreign as well as American purchasers of Marconi
ADRs .... [T] he court agrees that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over these persons
under the Exchange Act.").
139 See AstraZeneca Motion to Dismiss Opposition, supra note 116, at 42 n.33
("[W]ithout the ability to rely on the doctrine to find causation for foreign purchasers,
courts would be forced to make the illogical choice of either arbitrarily cutting off such
claims of U.S. citizens for failure to establish reliance, or finding that foreign markets are
efficient for U.S. investors but not foreign ones.").
140 423 F. Supp. 2d 105 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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purchasers of Bayer securities on foreign exchanges.14 1 The court
subsequently certified a class consisting of purchasers of Bayer shares
on the U.S. over-the-counter market and purchasers of Bayer ADRs on
the NYSE, as well as U.S. citizens or residents who purchased Bayer
ordinary shares or ADRs on any other exchange; 142 presumably, then,
the court satisfied itself that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the
claims of such investors. 143 Yet, as one commentator points out, "if
the market in the issuer's securities is in fact an efficient, global mar-
ket, then the jurisdiction plaintiffs seek to establish over only a subset
of claims based on foreign transactions . . . should-under the con-
duct test-be established over all claims based on foreign transac-
tions."1 44 The only way out of this seemingly illogical position would
be for the court to cut off such claims by U.S. purchasers for failure to
establish reliance,'145 but this approach would no doubt fly in the face
of Basic and would, moreover, ignore the realities of today's efficient
securities markets.
More troubling than the courts' dismissal of a valid economic the-
ory, though, is their tendency to do so because of concerns about ju-
risdictional overreach. 146 Cases like Baan and AstraZeneca illustrate a
common fear among U.S. courts that allowing foreign purchasers on
foreign exchanges to plead reliance through the fraud-on-the-global-
market theory would extend the jurisdictional reach of the federal se-
curities laws too far. As discussed above, this concern is properly ad-
dressed not by considering fraud-on-the-global-market, but by
considering the defendant's U.S.-based conduct. Furthermore, the
conclusion of the Baan and AstraZeneca courts makes little sense for
the F-cubed plaintiff who pleads direct reliance. If pleading reliance
through the fraud-on-the-global-market theory would extend the
reach of the federal securities laws too far, then why is the same not
true if the plaintiff pled reliance the old-fashioned way? Why would
the securities laws apply to a foreign purchaser on a foreign exchange
who read and directly relied on a defendant's statements 47 but not to
141 Bayer, much like AstraZeneca, concerned alleged misrepresentations and omissions
about the safety and commercial viability of a drug manufactured, distributed, and pro-
moted by the defendant, an international corporation headquartered in Germany whose
shares traded both abroad and in the United States. Id. at 106-07. And, like the As-
traZeneca court, the Bayer court dismissed the claims of F-cubed plaintiffs. Id. at 115.
142 See In re Bayer AG Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 1546, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2006) (order
certifying class).
143 The court, however, simply signed an order granting plaintiffs' motion for class
certification, depriving both sides of the reasoning behind its decision to do so. See id. at 3.
144 Buxbaum, supra note 14, at 47-48.
145 See AstraZeneca Motion to Dismiss Opposition, supra note 116, at 42 n.33.
146 See supra notes 118-21, 127-28 and accompanying text.




a foreign purchaser on a foreign exchange who took advantage of the
presumption of reliance afforded to him by Basic? U.S. courts have
yet to address this question.
CONCLUSION
As the NAB plaintiffs argued in their certiorari petition, "[t] he
Exchange Act and its role in transnational securities fraud is too im-
portant an issue in the current world-wide economic crisis to allow the
lower courts to continue floundering in disarray with divergent stan-
dards. ' 148 The arbitrariness with which U.S. courts apply the effects
and conduct tests in F-cubed class actions is highly problematic, and
without guidance from the legislature or the Supreme Court, lower
courts have been free to engage in the kind of artificial line drawing
that comparable cases with opposite outcomes such as NAB H and Al-
stom exemplify. Furthermore, lower courts are quick to dismiss the
fraud-on-the-global-market argument by citing concerns about juris-
dictional overreach. The proper way to address this concern, how-
ever, is through consideration of the first prong of the conduct test,
which involves the amount and nature of a defendant's U.S.-based
conduct, not through consideration of the second prong, where
fraud-on-the-global-market comes into play.
The Supreme Court is finally set to consider this important ques-
tion. To decide the case, the Court will no doubt have to pronounce a
rule of decision. Whether it adopts the approach of the Second Cir-
cuit to decide the facts of NAB or whether it announces an entirely
different standard remains to be seen. For example, the Court could
choose to adopt a transaction-based approach, limiting subject-matter
jurisdiction under the antifraud provisions to claims arising out of
transactions on U.S. markets; but such an approach would exclude
from a putative class any U.S. citizens who happened to purchase their
shares abroad. Arguably, though, the globalization of securities mar-
kets has resulted in an increased need for investor protection. Deny-
ing class membership to American investors, then, is not ideal.
Instead, the Court could adopt the approach of the NAB II and
AstraZeneca courts and require dismissal only of the claims of foreign-
ers purchasing on foreign exchanges. As discussed above, however,
this approach completely ignores the global nature of today's securi-
ties markets. It is simply illogical to suggest that a particular issuer's
securities trade in an efficient worldwide market with respect to cer-
tain purchasers (U.S. citizens purchasing abroad) but not with respect
to others (foreigners purchasing abroad). Furthermore, this ap-
148 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., No. 08-1191
(Mar. 23, 2009).
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proach fails to take seriously the premise of Basic v. Levinson. In an
efficient market-any efficient market-publicly available informa-
tion determines securities prices. If the market for a particular is-
suer's securities is an efficient one, it does not stop being so simply
because certain investors happen to be non-U.S. residents or happen
to have purchased their shares on a non-U.S. exchange.
This Note has attempted to show that the fraud-on-the-global-
market doctrine is a logical extension of the traditional fraud-on-the-
market theory and that, where there is an efficient worldwide market
for an issuer's securities, the doctrine ought to satisfy the second
prong of the conduct test. Nevertheless, more than logic is at play,
and when the Supreme Court tackles NAB, it will likely take a fresh
look at the question of how far the securities laws should apply. In
doing so, it need not choose between extending the reach of the se-
curities laws too far and denying the economic validity of the fraud-
on-the-global-market doctrine. If the Court retains the two-pronged
conduct test, it ought to address any concerns about jurisdictional
overreach as it considers the defendant's U.S.-based conduct. If the
Court finds the U.S.-based conduct sufficient-using whatever stan-
dard it deems appropriate, whether it is the Second Circuit's "more
than merely preparatory" test or an alternative approach-this finding
should appease any worry about extending the reach of the securities
laws too far. Free of any such concern, the Court should then con-
sider the fraud-on-the-global-market argument in connection with the
conduct test's second prong. As I have attempted to show, the fraud-
on-the-global-market doctrine is a viable theory given the intercon-
nectedness of today's securities markets, and the Court ought to ac-
cept it as a way to satisfy the conduct test's "direct causation" prong.
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